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Preface 
In many cases, the severity of imminent environmental damage demands that global 
or regional solutions be found and multinational action be taken quickly. But of what 
use is negotiating environmental agreements among nations if those agreements are not 
implemented faithfully or expeditiously ? 
Certainly, being able to reach a multilateral agreement at the bargaining table can be 
a major achievement; analysis of the negotiation process that facilitates such outcomes 
is important in providing insights and lessons learned to practitioners involved in future 
negotiations. Of equal importance is analysis of the post-agreement process, some of which 
involves additional negotiation activities at domestic and international levels. Treaty 
ratification and acceptance is one such post-agreement negotiation process. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold: 
To diagnose the extent of the problem of treaty ratification delays. 
To evaluate the situational correlates of such delays. 
In so doing, this paper provides new insight into the dynamics of an important phase 
of the post-agreement negotiation process. By understanding the problems involved in 
treaty ratification and their correlates, it may be possible to devise new structures and 
procedures to avert these problems at an earlier phase: during the negotiation itself. For 
instance, perhaps the drafting of agreements, the composition of national delegations, and 
the framing of issue linkages need to undergo a major overhaul. 
This research was funded, in part, by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace. 
It is part of a larger study being conducted by the Processes of International Negotiation 
(PIN) Project concerning the post-agreement negotiation process. 
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Abstract 
This paper assesses some of the implications of certain national economic and political 
factors on the likelihood and degree of treaty acceptance (ratification, accession, etc.) 
in the post-agreement negotiation period. The purpose of the study is to analyze the 
problem of delays in treaty acceptance with a view to suggesting how the negotiation 
and post-negotiation processes may be restructured so as to facilitate acceptance. The 
aim is to draw conclusions that have implications for policy making-to highlight what 
it is in the treaties themselves or in the conditions surrounding them that cause delays in 
acceptance and subsequent implementation. 
International environmental agreements entered into by European countries between 
1972-1992 are examined in this context. The data set includes 61 multilateral treaties, 
and the independent sovereign state is the unit of analysis. 
A literature review identifies what has been done in this area and enables focus on a 
few specific questions. 
The following types of variables are operationalized and measured in the study: 
Dependent Variable 
The extent of ratification problems. Measure: Average years to ratify (from adop- 
tion to entry into force). 
Independent Variables 
Issue saliency. Measure: R & D expenditure on environmental protection; 
Popular pressure. Measure: Public concern on environmental issues at the local, 
national and international level; 
National wealth. Measure: GDP/capita; 
Quality of life. Measure: Human Development Index. 
This paper provides data on the initial step of the post-negotiation or post-agreement 
cycle, namely acceptance, so as to suggest further directions for investigation and to 
provide the background for a next phase of research on the behavioral implementation 
and compliance that follow on acceptance. 
Some alternatives to ratification discussed in the literature are also presented. 
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Post-Negot iat ion Impasses 
in the Environmental Domain 
The Influence of Some Political and 
Economic Factors on Environmental 
Treaty Acceptance 
Anna Rebecca Korula 
Introduction 
1.1 Environmental Negotiations, Treaty Making and 
Implement at ion 
The recognition by governments that environmental issues transcend national boundaries 
has been accompanied by the realization that ad hoc and disparate responses by individ- 
ual states will not solve these pressing problems. Global warming, ozone depletion, de- 
forestation, air and marine pollution, nuclear waste, and the destruction of living natural 
resources are some of the interrelated threats facing the planet. States are now grappling 
with environmental issues and are increasingly entering into a number of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements (Sands, 1989). 
Environmental negotiations are critical, import ant, unavoidable, if the earth is to 
maintain sustainable development. A major objective of environmental negotiations is 
treaty-making, so that the term may be regarded as roughly synonymous to environmental 
law making; treaties are the outcomes of the negotiation process. In Sjostedt (1993) it 
emerges that environmental negotiations differ from other negotiations in that they exhibit 
the following characteristics, which add an extra level of complexity to reaching agreement: 
multiple parties with multiple roles, multiple issues, meaningless boundaries, scientific and 
technological uncertainty, power asymmetry, negative perceptions of immediate outcomes, 
long time frame, changing actors, inclusion of public opinion, the institutionalization of 
solutions, lobbies at the national, as well as intergovernmental level, the role played by the 
media, and the need for scientific evidence. New regimes and rules, as well as the inclusion 
of the scientific community, the participation of nongovernment a1 organizations (NGOs) , 
and the nature of the issues require an unprecedented degree of international cooperation 
(in coordinating research, monitoring trends, harmonizing measures and regulations). 
Treaty-making is the most advanced type of negotiation. It is also the most common 
type of negotiation, because it provides the only means of arriving at legally binding 
rules. Treaty-making has three optional outcomes, taking the environmental domain 
for example, first, it may codify measures to control the environment, second, it may 
set a precedent that can be used in similar cases elsewhere, and third, it may turn the 
outcome of negotiations into a symbiosis of legal and scientific data, in which law provides 
the binding power. However, unless accepted and implemented, they remain impotent 
and ineffective. From the outset, environmental treaties have to meet the concerns of 
all parties involved, to assure their full compliance (Kremenyuk and Lang, 1993) and 
they must engage sufficient interest at the national level to result in acceptance and 
implementation. Treaties should be drafted such that they are strict enough to be useful 
but not so strict that it makes participants and non-participants unwilling to ratify them. 
International environmental agreements are the predominant legal method for address- 
ing transboundary environmental problems. As the problems become increasingly global 
in nature, broader agreements pertaining to the oceans, atmosphere, forests, global cli- 
mate, Antarctica and endangered species will assume a greater role in the preservation 
of the earth's environment. Before the issue of ratification arises, states must decide how 
to prepare and conduct negotiations. Voting procedures, scientific and technical infor- 
mation to be used, the form and scope of the agreement are all features that have to be 
determined before proceeding to the negotiations. The negotiations of the Law of the 
Sea Convention of 1982 demonstrates that these choices have considerable impact on the 
success of the negotiations and the effectiveness of the ultimate agreement (Harvard Law 
Review, 1991). 
The issue areas are of international concern and often of global importance. However, 
a potential source of uncoordinated activity stems from the fact that while environmental 
issues, by their very nature, may have to be negotiated at  the international level, they 
are implemented and regulated at much lower levels. For implementation to be a faithful 
representation of the intent of negotiated agreements, existing local regulations must be 
adaptable and local authorities induced to be compliant. Again, to cause these local actors 
to behave as intended may require extensive domestic negotiations. For example, in the 
case of acid-rain regulations in the United States and Canada, the standards imposed by 
Clean Air Acts or any future negotiated agreement must be implemented by the states and 
provinces, respectively, who will not be direct participants in the negotiations themselves. 
In biological conservation negotiations, local and regional authorities, of necessity, play 
a significant role in the implementation of land use and natural reserve plans that are 
agreed to in negotiation. Coordination problems can often be solved through restructuring 
the formal institutions or informal processes of negotiation, although further study into 
reorganization and reformulation approaches is warranted (SjZistedt and Spector, 1993). 
Barratt-Brown (1991) in discussing the Montreal Protocol notes that international ne- 
gotiations me multidimensional and heavily influenced by domestic politics. Multilateral 
negotiations are complicated by the almost automatic addition of the national political 
dimension. The political repercussions have both domestic and international dimensions. 
The situation is made even more complex when the issue area is the environmental do- 
main. 
Domestically, environmental issues inevitably involve the interests of industry and 
labor. A nation's ability to deal with environmental issues is influenced by its existing in- 
ternal and external situation; the more this situation is beset by tension and confrontation, 
the less the prospects of a solution, and vice versa. Therefore, environmental issues may 
generate either confrontation or cooperation in international relations, depending upon 
political circumstances (Kremenyuk and Lang, 1993). The importance of binding agree- 
ments in potentially conflictual situations therefore can not be denied, and the criticality 
of effectiveness in the post-agreement period can not be emphasized enough. Treaties that 
result from international negotiation are subject to domestic politics and parliamentary 
processes in democratic countries; herein lies the problem of treaty acceptance, and ulti- 
mate compliance with its provisions. These are typical issues in post-agreement processes, 
which are discussed further'in section 2. 
The difference between multilateral treaty making and lawmaking in democratic soci- 
eties is that parliamentary proceedings have the force of law and have to be followed by 
all government officials, the courts, corporations, and individuals. An international treaty 
however, is part of international law and whether it is complied with or not depends on the 
political will of the parties, since no international central authority exercises jurisdiction 
over this area. However, new directions are beginning to emerge in this regard. Some of 
these are discussed briefly below (see p. 5). 
The period from 1960 to 1989 was a period of gestation for international environmental 
law, whereas the 90s and beyond will witness the development of international cooperation 
through a number of new conventions. One of the main trends will be to implement, 
complete and reinforce the many existing agreements;' another trend will be to rely more 
frequently on quantified targets in order to describe more precisely the responsibilities 
of the contracting parties, which should subsequently become internationally verifiable. 
Sanctions could be provided in order to discourage inadequate reporting, and conversely, 
economic incentives might be introduced in order to induce countries to implement their 
undertakings fully (OECD, 1991a). 
Therefore, successful negotiation of environmental treaties, while of utmost impor- 
tance, should not downplay the even more critical areas of the post-negotiation process, 
i.e., ratification, implementation, verification, monitoring and compliance. Governments, 
and the public, should come to realize that, as with human rights issues, international 
cooperation, the subjugation of sovereign rights in the interests of the commons and the 
creation of vigorous mechanisms for monitoring can only serve to further the interests of 
the parties, and ultimately of mankind. 
This paper examines some of the factors that, in addition to the political will of 
parties, influence the process that ideally begins as soon as signatures are appended to a 
multilateral document. 
1.2 International Environmental Law and the Issue of 
Sovereignty 
It is an established principle of international law that sovereign states can bind themselves 
through international agreement and that treaties thus made are meant to be observed 
(pacta sunt servanda). States do assent to treaties and cede some of their sovereign 
authority to other states or to international organizations, however, in practice they do 
not always translate this into action. States often vigorously defend their sovereignty 
because they perceive their physical integrity and political existence to be more important. 
'UNEP'e 1991 Register of International Treaties and Other Agreements in the Field of the Environ- 
ment lists 152 multilateral treaties. If bilateral instruments and legal instruments other than formal 
agreements are included, e.g., the FA0 International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of 
Pesticides or the London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade, 
the number of international legal instruments with environmental provisions is in the range of 850 and 
above (Brown Weiss, et al. 1992; Sand, 1991; and Chayes and Chayes, 1991b). 
Sovereignty concerns are not the only barriers to effective international environmental 
commitments. Environmental treaties often require substantial economic sacrifices on the 
part of the state parties. These economic concerns may both inhibit treaty ratification 
and undermine treaty compliance. 
Concerns regarding sovereignty and economic pressures currently hamper the ratifica- 
tion and enforcement of international environmental treaties. Traditional techniques of 
encouraging treaty enforcement, such as publicity and political pressure, may solve some 
of these problems, but they make treaty enforcement more difficult. To enhance treaty 
compliance, some observers have emphasized the role of international adjudication. How- 
ever, this is largely consensual and states that are unwilling to bind themselves to coercive 
sanctions are just as wary of compulsory adjudication. Agencies that can monitor treaty 
compliance, gather and analyze information, and lower information costs without signif- 
icantly reducing state sovereignty offer a more realistic alternative for enhancing treaty 
enforcement. Monitoring by international agencies can partially address these difficulties. 
Effective international environment a1 agreements must therefore establish institutional 
arrangements for continuous cooperation (Harvard Law Review, 1991). 
The question of sovereignty is treated also in Lang et al. (1991). In the chapter on 
Environmental Security and Global Change, Giinther Handl (pp.85-87) suggests that 
sovereignty is being redefined. Decision-making powers which had been exclusively in the 
national domain are increasingly shared with other states or have completely devolved 
upon the international community. Concepts such as 'intergenerational equity", "sustain- 
able developmentn or 'global commonsn hint at restrictions on state autonomy and have 
been invoked to limit the freedom of nation-states in the interests of the larger community. 
The rights that emanate from the concept of sovereignty are not unfettered freedoms but 
powers shared between the holder of the power and the community of states. Sovereignty 
no longer is a legal basis for exclusion, but has become the legal basis for inclusion, or 
of a commitment to cooperate for the good of the international community. From an 
environmental point of view states are now bound together in a global 'community of 
necessityn which has given rise to an increasingly complex matrix of mutual rights and 
obligations. Handl further suggests that ultimately the failure or success of the mission 
to secure global environmental security will be a function of the determination to press 
for timely structural adjustment. 
Luzius Wildhaber, in a commentary on the Handl paper, notes that in environmental 
matters, as in others, absolute sovereignty and unfettered freedom of nation-states to 
act as they wish within their territorial limits are incompatible with global survival and 
with the rule of law. Absolute sovereignty he holds is incompatible with present day 
interdependence and solidarity, and it conflicts strangely with the transterritoriality of 
the economy, media, traffic, tourism, ideologies, the depletion of the ozone layer, global 
warming, vanishing whales, elephants, gorillas or the tropical rain forests. He concludes, 
that sovereignty must be mitigated by the exigencies of interdependence. Further, he 
suggests it is a relative notion, adaptable to new situations and needs, a discretionary 
freedom within, and not from, international law. It is high time to recognize that it is 
quite unacceptable still to conceive of sovereignty as an absolute right to pollute and 
cause injury to other states and their inhabitants, to endanger the global environment: 
the duty to prevent such interference, pollution and deprivation must become a part of 
modern international law. The erosion of sovereignty is also discussed in Springer (1983). 
With regard to sovereignty, a significant point made by Sands (1989) is that the 
Declaration of the Hague of 1989 proposes that decision-making procedures be made 
effective even in the absence of unanimous agreement and thereby accepts the need to 
move away from the principle of state sovereignty. It implicitly recognizes environmental 
degradation as a human rights issue affecting "the right to live in dignity in a viable global 
environmentn and also implicitly recognizes the role of the private sector in international 
environmental protection. Although the Hague Declaration is not legally binding, it is 
important as a statement of intent from 24 states representing diverse political views. 
French (1992) also comments on the Hague Declaration being revolutionary because it 
goes well beyond traditional concepts of international law, which are based on the notion 
of a compact between sovereign states that cannot be bound to an international agreement 
without their express consent; with the Hague Declaration the signatories were assenting 
that sovereignty must be "pooledn when it comes to the global environment. 
Craig and George (1983) recognize the "complex interdependencen between states ex- 
tant in the economic sphere, as well as in the ecological and biospheric systems. They 
suggest that complex interdependence is causing important modifications of traditional 
"realistn premises regarding the essential characteristics of international systems and poli- 
tics. One of the changes is that the long-standing assumption that states are the dominant 
actors in world politics has been challenged by the growth in numbers and strength of non- 
governmental actors. States also no longer act as coherent units in international relations 
aa they now interact with each other as subunits on specific issues with little direction or 
control by their own governments. 
The most important objective of treaty-making is to encourage acceptance and sub- 
sequent compliance. The question of sovereignty invariably surfaces in this context. It 
affects the acceptance process, for states are generally quite sensitive on this point and 
use it to fight shy of agreement or acceptance. 
To ensure compliance, several mechanisms have been suggested in the literature. Spe- 
cial committees, commissions and the submission of national reports (as stipulated in 
certain human rights treaties) have been used for decades to monitor compliance. Reach- 
ing agreement on a treaty is only half the battle, notes French (1992); implementation of 
the treaties or compliance is the other half. Most treaties do not even stipulate any sanc- 
tions and as international agencies do not have police powers, there is little enforcement 
and little data on compliance. Regime building is increasingly being regarded as critical 
to compliance and attendant commitment. There is a growing literature on monitoring, 
compliance and regime building (Young, 1989; Hajost, 1990; Brown Weiss, 1991; Victor, 
Chayes and Skolnikoff, 1992; USGAO, 1992). There is mounting concern that treaties, 
even though accepted, are not always complied with, even though it is generally recognized 
(Henkin, 1968) that most nations abide by their agreements most of the time. Even when 
the political will exists, in reality things turn out differently: As French (1992) reports, a 
recent poll resulted in discouraging news that Norway, widely viewed as a world leader on 
international environmental issues, is likely to fall short of meeting its commitments in 12 
of the 27 major international agreements to which it is a party. It is increasingly urgent 
therefore, to investigate reasons behind non-acceptance and subsequent compliance. 
Problem Description 
Some of the most critical problems relating to treaties, especially environmental ones, 
occur in the post-agreement negotiation period. Acceptance, the first step in the post- 
agreement phase, can take several years and implementation of the agreements may often 
be complex or fraught with problems. If a treaty requires a certain number of ratifica- 
tions to enter into force, the entire process can stall for want of this legal technicality. 
Acceptance, then, obscures a range of economic, political and cultural factors that either 
singly or in combination serve to obstruct the passage of a treaty into binding law. It is 
important therefore to understand the factors behind long acceptance times. 
Once an agreement is ratified by a nation its provisions have to be put into effect 
behaviorally, passed as legislation, enforced, obeyed and monitored. The long time frame 
for acceptance and behavioral implementation, in apposition to the pressing nature of 
many of the issues addressed by environmental agreements make successfully negotiated 
outcomes result in being too late, and mostly inadequate to the problem by the time they 
finally come into effect. This aspect is likely to worsen with the increasing complexity of 
environmental problems. International mechanisms required to monitor compliance with 
the agreements also have to be negotiated and implemented, drawing out the process 
even more. This slow pace of international cooperation when placed in juxtaposition with 
scientific problems whose consequences may become irreversible by the time agreed upon 
limits become effective, highlights the urgency of the problem (Spector, 1992a). 
As discussed above, a recent estimate of the number of environmental treaties is close to 
900, with more agreements being concluded as new aspects or fresh problems are revealed 
by scientific and technological advances. The need for better approaches to negotiations 
and treaty making, as well as more efficient acceptance times hardly needs justification. 
The Salzburg Initiative (1991) and Chayes (1991) recognize this: The former points out 
that key groups left out of the negotiation process may even try to block ratification, 
thereby preventing the real problem from being addressed. 
Spector (1992b) suggests that international conflict resolution can be viewed as a 
multi-staged and interactive system for joint problem-solving. First, disputants engage in 
prenegotiation to diagnose and plan for a full-fledged negotiation in search for mutually 
acceptable solutions. In the second phase, the negotiation itself, disputants express their 
need for agreement. Finally, in post-agreement negotiation, disputants engage in intensive 
joint problem-solving activities focused on ratifying, implementing, complying with, and 
if necessary, renegotiating a solution. The stages played out in the international setting 
may be replicated at the domestic level, as a precursor to ratification. 
A preliminary framework for the post-agreement negotiation process is shown in Fig- 
ure 1. In this figure the two interactive components of the post-agreement process are 
depicted, namely, the domestic and the international segments, in which negotiations con- 
tinue at multiple levels, in new fora, with new actors, ultimately resulting in compliance 
or non-compliance. In the domestic component there are three subprocesses: First, accep- 
tance by each national government is generally required, during which various domestic 

stakeholders come together in a negotiation process. After acceptance implement ation is 
required at a national level, by which laws and regulations are enacted to conform with 
the stipulations of the agreement. Monitoring and reporting are the final functions at the 
domestic level. 
At the international level of the post-agreement negotiation process first there is regime 
formation during which the rules and procedures of the agreement are institutionalized 
and implemented. This is followed by regime operation, when data concerning partici- 
pant actions are collected, compliance is monitored, verified and enforced, and disputes 
resolved. The final subprocess is that of regime adjustment, in which the rules, procedures 
and targets originally established in the negotiated agreement might be modified to ac- 
commodate scientific advances or fresh information gathered on the effects of compliance. 
The subprocesses of the post-agreement negotiation process, namely, ratification, im- 
plemeptation, monitoring and reporting, and regime formation, operation and adjustment 
have received relatively little attention by researchers. These processes are crucial to 
achieving compliance or noncompliance with the treaties negotiated. Compliance with 
an agreement's provisions is the ultimate measure of the success of international negotia- 
tion. However, compliance is a difficult phenomenon to observe and measure (Chayes and 
Chayes, 1991a; Chayes, 1991; Brown Weiss, 1992; Fischer, 1991; Sand, 1991). Compliance 
is a function of the dynamics of post-agreement negotiation. If domestic stakeholders, 
for example, take tough positions against a treaty and form blocking coalitions during 
the post-agreement negotiation subprocess of ratification, it is likely to result in major 
problems in achieving compliance if the treaty barely achieves entry into force (Spector, 
1992b). 
Other problems in the post-agreement period are made evident in an OECD (1991a) 
study which concludes that the environmental problems of today in the OECD countries 
are mostly problems remaining from the unfinished agendas of the 1970s or 1980s. The 
relatively slow pace of progress in dealing with and solving them, the study suggests, can 
be partially explained by two sets of factors: 
Certain weak and inefficient aspects of environmental policies; 
The close interdependencies between the state of the environment and the state of 
the economy, nationally and internationally. 
In this research project only the first step of the post-agreement negotiation process 
is examined, namely, ratification, as understood in the wider context of acceptance, as 
defined on p. 11. More specifically, some economic and political factors are examined so 
as to assess their impact on acceptance. The second step, behavioral implementation, or 
the action to be taken by state parties, in accordance with treaty provisions, to prevent 
environmental pollution or to preserve the levels of pollution so that they do not regress 
or worsen, is not considered here. 
The objective of this pilot study is to identify some of the correlates of the problem 
of delays in acceptance so that the situation might be restructured, thereby highlighting 
ways of facilitating acceptance. 
Only the acceptance of multilateral treaties is considered in this study as it is mean- 
ingless in the case of bilateral treaties; in the case of bilateral treaties ratification by 
both parties is imperative. It is not assumed here that ratification is the end all; compli- 
ance, further down the road, is of far more importance, but is beyond the scope of this 
investigation. 
Some of the common problems associated with acceptance, as evident in the literature, 
are presented below (p. 18). 
3 Legal Processes 
3.1 Acceptance 
The term "acceptancen is used in a generic sense, as formulated in the Schachter et al. 
(1971) study, to connote ratification, accession, succession or any other form by which a 
state expresses its consent to become a party to a treaty. The term includes "definitive 
signaturesn but excludes signatures that do not constitute definitive consent. The term 
also covers adherence by signatory states as well as by states that had not participated 
in the treaty negotiations or had not signed the resulting instrument. 
3.2 Adoption, Signature, Ratification, Entry into ~ o r c e ~  
In international law adoption is taken to mean that step of the treaty-making process 
wherein the final form and content of the agreement is agreed upon. Adoption of a treaty 
text at  an international conference takes place by the vote of two-thirds of the states 
2Thie section ie drawn largely from Starke, 1989. 
present and voting, unless by the same majority these states decide to apply a different 
:ule (Vienna Convention, art.9(2)). The adoption of multilateral instruments by the 
organs of international institutions has also become accepted practice in certain subject 
areas. Provisions of a treaty may also be adopted by consensus, as in the case of the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
When the find draft of a treaty has been agreed upon, the instrument is ready for 
signature. It is generally effected at a formal closing session, by each of the delegates 
signing at the same time and place and in the presence of each other. Unless there is an 
agreement to dispense with signature, this is essential for a treaty, because it serves to 
authenticate the text. The effect of signature of a treaty depends on whether or not the 
treaty is subject to acceptance-ratification, adherence or approval. If this is the case, 
signature means no more than that the delegates have agreed upon a text, are willing to 
accept it and refer it to their governments for action that the governments may choose to 
take, which could be either acceptance or rejection of the treaty. Signature therefore is 
a governmental act, whereas ratification requires the approval of parliament (see Figure 
2). If the treaty is not subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval, or is silent on this 
point, it is generally understood to mean that in the absence of contrary provision, the 
instrument is binding as from signature. The date of the treaty is usually taken to be the 
date on which it was signed. 
Ratification per se is the approval by the head of state or government of the signature 
appended to the treaty by appointed plenipotentiaries. In modern practice, however, it 
has come to possess more significance than a simple act of confirmation, being deemed 
to represent the formal declaration by a state of its consent to be bound by a treaty. In 
Article I1 of the Vienna Convention, ratification was defined to mean 'the international 
act...whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a 
treaty'. In consistence with this, ratification is not held to have retroactive effect, so as 
to make the treaty obligatory from the date of signature. 
More than two-thirds of currently registered treaties make no provision whatever for 
ratification, although treaties do stipulate whether or not signature, or signature subject to 
ratification, acceptance, etc. is the method chosen by the states concerned. The acceptable 
view today is that it is purely a matter of the intention of the parties whether a treaty 
does or does not require ratification as a condition of its binding operation. Article 14 of 
the Vienna Convention provides that the consent of a state to be bound by a treaty is 

expressed by ratification if: 
(a) the treaty so expressly provides; or 
(b) the negotiating states otherwise agree that ratification is necessary; or 
(c) the treaty has been signed subject to ratification; or 
(d) an intention to sign subject to ratification appears from the Full Powers or was 
expressed during negotiations. 
Starke (1989) suggests that the practice of ratification rests on the following rational 
grounds: 
(a) States are entitled to have an opportunity of re-examining and reviewing instru- 
ments signed by their delegates before undertaking the obligations therein specified. 
(b) By reason of its sovereignty, a state is entitled to withdraw from participation 
in any treaty should it so desire. 
(c) Often a treaty calls for amendments or adjustments in municipal law. The period 
between signature and ratification enables states to pass the necessary legislation or 
obtain the necessary parliamentary approvals, so that they may thereupon proceed 
to ratification. This is important in the case of federal states, where, if legislation to 
carry into effect treaty provisions falls within the powers of the central government, 
the states may have to be consulted by the central government before it can proceed 
with ratification. 
(d) There is also the democratic principle that the government should consult public 
opinion either in parliament or elsewhere as to whether a particular treaty should 
be confirmed. 
In practice however, ratification can mean different things to different societies, as eco- 
nomic, political, social and cultural factors are intricately intertwined in the process of 
acceptance. 
The power of refusing ratification is deemed to be inherent in state sovereignty, and 
accordingly, at international law there is neither a legal nor a moral duty to ratify a 
treaty. There is also no obligation, other than common courtesy, to convey to other states 
concerned a statement of the reasons for refusing to ratify. 
The acceptance formula clause is a recent practice that allows an instrument to be 
open for an indefinite time. It is the act of becoming a party to a treaty by adherence of 
any kind, in accordance with a state's municipal constitutional law. The term acceptance, 
used here in a sense different from the Schachter et al. definition on p. 11, is employed by 
states not wishing to use the term ratification, as this might imply an obligation to submit 
a treaty to the legislature for approval, or to go through some undesired constitutional 
procedure. Therefore, the formula 'signature subject to acceptance' is used in the case 
of treaties where ratification would be inappropriate or legally inconvenient for certain of 
the states that are signatories. 
Entry into force is dependent upon the provisions of a treaty, or upon what the con- 
tracting states have agreed on explicitly. Many treaties become operative on the date 
of their signature, but where ratification, or approval is necessary, the general rule of 
international law is that the treaty concerned comes into force only after the exchange or 
deposit of ratifications, acceptances, or approvals by all the states signatories or on the 
deposit of a prescribed number of ratifications. Sometimes, a precise date for entry into 
force is fixed without regard to the number of ratifications received, or at the occurrence 
of a specific event, e.g., even after its ratification by all states signatories, the Locarno 
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (1925) was to enter into force only after Germany's admission 
to the League of Nations. 
It is generally provided in the treaty that it will enter into force for each state party 
on the date of deposit of the appropriate instrument of consent to be bound, or within a 
fixed time-usually 90 days-after such deposit. 
3.3 The Processes of Acceptance 
Treaties are mostly permanent records of the outcomes of negotiations; critical guidelines, 
inviting commitment and compliance. However, myriad processes are at work on the 
international and domestic plane. In the process of acceptance, a host of political, social, 
economic and cultural factors, for example, during the enactment of domestic legislation, 
in combination or singly, feed into the process. Simply stated, international agreements 
are created in two stages: representatives first meet to negotiate a text of the agreement, 
and states then ratify it. International law, however, does not specify how to implement 
this two-step process. The primary source of law governing the creation of international 
agreements are the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the 1986 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or 
Between International Organizations. Under both conventions, states and international 
organizations have the capacity to enter binding agreements but cannot be bound by 
any agreement without their consent. A state or international organization that seeks 
to enter into an agreement must send a valid representative to negotiate an authentic 
text of the agreement. Once the negotiations produce an authentic text, each state may 
express its consent to be bound by the agreement, usually ratifying it, and may enter 
reservations that alter the terms of the agreement. Beyond these basic requirements, the 
Vienna Conventions do not mandate any particular processes of negotiation or ratification. 
Thus, each state is free to select its own method of ratifying agreements (Harvard Law 
Review, 1991). In states with parliamentary systems, ratification procedures may differ 
from more autocratic systems of government. 
Given the diversity of methods, it may take several years before enough parties ratify 
an agreement for it to enter into force. Although every state that signs an agreement 
has an obligation to "refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the 
[agreement]" until it enters into force, the details of this obligation remain vague. As 
formulated in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
paras 311-339, 1986, "it is often unclear what actions would have [the] effect [of defeating 
the object and purpose of the agreement]". Moreover, signatory states are not required 
to take affirmative actions to comply with agreements that have not yet taken effect. 
Thus, delay pending ratification can render environmental agreements ineffective if the 
underlying environmental problem worsens or becomes irreversible. States occasionally 
even reverse their position and refuse to ratify agreements they have negotiated (Harvard 
Law Review, 1991). 
The signing of a treaty customarily completes the first phase of a formalized effort 
toward institutionalized international environmental cooperation, for example. A signed 
treaty generally represents the professed intent of signatory governments, but govern- 
ments, particularly democratic ones, are complex and their authority sometimes divided, 
as in the United States, between executive and legislative branches. Treaties negotiated 
under the authority of the President of the United States, for example, do not bind the 
nation until ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Senate. Treaties are negotiated by 
representatives of governments of the day, but negotiations subsequently move to the 
respective national capitals and may encounter either inertia or resistance. 
In the phases of ratification and implementation other agencies of governance enter 
the process-notably parliaments and bureaucracies (Caldwell, 1988). A new contribu- 
tory source to the process of acceptance is parliamentary debates, which are viewed as 
useful fora for airing scientific theories and exploring conflicting economic and social in- 
terests. New mechanisms have arisen linking parliamentarians of North and South on 
environmental issues, providing fora for mutual education, exchange of information and 
coordinated lobbying on specific issues such as climate change or biological diversity. 
These bodies range from subcommittees of a large, formal and traditional institution (the 
Interparliamentary Union) to smaller groups (Parliamentarians for Global Action), to in- 
formal ad hoc networks or conferences. All of these serve to bring national parliaments 
and parliamentarians closer to the actual process of intergovernmental negotiations than 
ever before (Benedick, 1993). This could put pressure on governments to accept treaties 
faster, especially in cases where it is the North-South divide that causes negotiations or 
acceptance to stall. 
The USA's ratification process illustrates how problems of delay or reversal may arise. 
As most multilateral environmental agreements are article 113 treaties and not executive 
agreements, two thirds of the Senate must consent for the USA to ratify them. There have 
been instances where the Senate has explicitly rejected international agreements reached 
by the President. On other occasions, as in the case of SALT 11, the President had not 
attempted to obtain the Senate's consent in light of indications that the treaty would 
be rejected. This aspect of the non-ratification of SALT I1 is also examined by Caldwell 
(1991) and is discussed further on p. 23. The Senate has also imposed conditions on 
its consent to ratification, which might lead the President to formulate a reservation, in 
which case the USA can become a party to the agreement only if other parties accept 
the reservation (when another state makes a reservation to an agreement to which the 
USA is a party, the USA cannot accept the reservation without the Senate's consent. 
However, for multilateral agreements, the Senate's consent may be inferred from its tacit 
acceptance of the President's acquiescence to the reservation). The formulation of such a 
reservation may reopen political issues resolved during the original negotiations, thus the 
SArticle 11 in the constitution of the USA, where it provides that the President of the United States 
"shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur." 
USA's ratification process may not only delay the entry into force of an agreement, but 
also could jeopardize its existence (Harvard Law Review, 1991). 
4 Political & Economic Factors Associated with 
Acceptance: A Literature Survey 
Numerous causes for non-acceptance or delayed acceptance have been advanced in the 
research literature which may be drawn upon to formulate hypotheses for testing. Some 
of these are described briefly in this section. Most of the studies offer qualitative descrip- 
tions. Only three studies stand out as having made attempts at quantification, based 
on empirical evidence, namely, Schachter et al. (1971), Smart and Murray (1984) and 
Spector (1992a). The studies are discussed chronologically, by date of publication. 
The Schachter et al. (1971) UNITAR study of 81 multilateral UN lreaties appears to 
be the most important examination of the acceptance of treaties. A statistical analysis of 
the acceptance record of UN treaties was carried out and some conclusions drawn on some 
of the reasons behind non-acceptance. They maintain that delay in acceptance or non- 
acceptance often does not result from deliberate decisions on the part of governments, 
but from circumstances that are extraneous to the substance of the treaties, such as 
administrative problems, enactment of domestic legislation, inadequacy of economic and 
human resources, which do not imply disagreement with the aims of the treaties (see 
Table 1, p. 27). The information about extraneous factors detailed in the study, some of 
which are noted below, was obtained through interviews with represerllatives of member 
states, legal advisers, UN experts and officials familiar with the area, as well as other 
sources. 
Schachter et al. (1971) also found that certain objective factors were related to the 
ratification of international treaties. They determined that small countries and newer UN 
member states rarely ratified treaties. Administrative problems were mentioned as major 
impediments retarding greater acceptance of international treaties. The inadequacy of 
economic and human resources of individual countries were considered important deter- 
rents. Some countries lacked the expertise and trained personnel needed for the essential 
preliminary tasks connected with treaties, such as translation into local languages. Some 
countries could not deal with treaties because of limited staff and budgets. 
Schachter et al. (1971) also examine the national administrative machinery of some 
twenty countries so as to identify factors that cause delays in ratification, and suggest 
ways to improve the process. 
Endicott (1977) investigates the 1975-76 debate over ratification of the Nuclear Non- 
proliferation Treaty (NNPT) in Japan and highlights reasons for the six-year delay in 
ratification. He concludes that the composition of the Diet over most of this period was 
important to the fate of the NNPT. Another domestic factor was that a t  the time the lead- 
ing party advocated the ratification, other issues came to the front on the domestic scene, 
namely the revision of an election law and a political funds control measure, which took 
precedence over two other pressing issues, an antimonopoly law reform and ratification 
of the Japan-South Korean Continental Shelf Agreement. The impact of the Lockheed 
Affair was also felt in the Diet in 1976 and served to bring all substantive deliberations 
to a halt, including those on the NNPT. 
While the Lockheed Affair monopolized the attention of most of Japan's political 
world, the importance of the NNPT was underscored by a visiting Parliamentary delega- 
tion from Canada. The Canadians supposedly relayed the very real possibility of future 
nuclear fuel supply disadvantages for Japan if ratification of the treaty was not forth- 
coming. This pressure, plus that of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Disarmament 
Committee and indications of growing concern from Mongolia, Indonesia and Bulgaria of 
Japanese intentions made increasing impressions on the Japanese government. In addi- 
tion, the U.S. Department of Commerce required special export procedures on 24 nuclear 
power industry related items. These caused shipment delays and increasing inconvenience 
to the nuclear power industry. 
Some external events also influenced the process of ratification, namely, the convening 
of the International NNPT Review Conference in Geneva. If Japan did not ratify the 
pact it would only receive observer status and would be the only major industrial power, 
together with France, not to be a full member of the NNPT system; and Japan wanted 
its concerns regarding the security of non-nuclear nations to be incorporated into the final 
declaration. 
Other possible determinants were the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
agreement with Japan that granted it equality with EURATOM states and the 1975 
Review Conference, which incorporated Japanese desires into its final declaration; both 
had some direct influence. Further, the Indian explosion of a "nuclear devicen increased 
the pressure from those concerned about nuclear proliferation. The USA, USSR, Great 
Britain and Canada made special efforts to highlight the possible disadvantages of not 
joining the NNPT. Soviet displeasure was expressed at the time when the USSR was also 
asking for bids from Japanese firms to participate, at a time when the Japanese nuclear 
industry had considerable idle capacity, in a venture worth over two billion dollars to 
build nuclear generating units for the current Soviet five-year plan. The pressure from 
the Canadians carried weight as well because about a third of the 100,000 tons of uranium 
contracted for purchase up to 1990 was to come from Canada. 
In considering why 1976 was the year for ratification Endicott implies that the forces 
that came to bear on the Japanese decision-making process in 1976 as well as events 
specific to 1976 created pressure to ratify. The impact of a draft Defense White Paper 
and the political imperatives of an election year are examples on the domestic scene. The 
Diet had to be dissolved that year and candidates wanted to be able to point to some 
accomplishments. Besides, in a nation that had suffered a nuclear blast, people had strong 
feelings on the subject of nuclear weapons. A December 1975 poll revealed that 51.4% of 
the respondents favored ratification, while only 17.2% opposed it. The ratification of the 
NNPT represented a national desire never to relive the horrors of 1945. 
Other reasons for acceptance have also been advanced. For example, in his Ph.D. 
thesis, Cho (1981) suggests that it was the functional and positional centrality of the 
Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki that brought about the ratification of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Prime Minister played a central role in bringing about 
Japan's ratification of the treaty. The critical variables considered in this study were 
hierarchical groupism and collectivist norms of consensus decision-making that are deeply 
rooted in the cultural tradition of Japan, as well as leadership style. 
Weissbrodt (1982) reviews a United Nations mechanism for encouraging the ratifi- 
cation of treaties, namely, the Working Group on the Encouragement of Universal Ac- 
ceptance of Human Rights Instruments, established in 1979 by the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. One of the reasons for non- 
ratification of treaties presented to the Working Group was federalism, which was viewed 
as being an impediment to ratification in Australia and the United States. The Working 
Group was to determine the extent of the problem and to consult with countries such as 
Australia and Canada, which had overcome federalism difficulties in ratifying some of the 
principal human rights treaties. 
Other problems that the above Working Group identified at its 1981 session regarding 
the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were the following 
reasons given by governments: (1) the word Uoptional"; (2) the fact that individuals would 
be entitled to file complaints against states; and (3) the overlap between the procedure 
in the Protocol and certain human rights structures. Yet another obstacle to ratification 
involved the Slavery Convention: one government expressed concern as to the compul- 
sory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. With regard to the International 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, the Working 
Group noted the reasons often given by states for not becoming parties were as follows: 
(1) the states were already parties to the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; (b) in their view the definition of the crime of 
apartheid itself was rather vague; (c) the Convention established extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction for the crime of apartheid; and (d) there was incompatibility between the 
obligations imposed by the Convention and domestic legislation. Incompatibility with 
domestic legislation was evoked by States as a reason for not adhering to several other 
instruments as well. 
A significant study by Smart and Murray (1984) examines the social and economic 
conditions in 152 countries and relates them to the ratification of two major international 
drug control treaties. They found that socio-economic factors relating to the higher like- 
lihood of ratification of drug treaties are countries which had: (i) a substantial drug 
problem; (2) higher economic development; (3) larger populations; (4) many ratifications 
of non-drug treaties; (5) higher spending in health and education; and (6) longer mem- 
bership in the United Nations. 
Ratifications of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the Convention on Psy- 
chotropic Substances were examined using the above hypotheses and conclusions were 
drawn that (1) countries which ratified only the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
have greater drug problems that those which ratified both or none, and those ratifying 
both are more similar to those ratifying the Single Convention than those ratifying neither; 
(2) ratifications are more common among developed than developing countries, although 
countries ratifying only the Single Convention are the most developed; (3) ratifications 
are not more common among larger countries nor among those with a higher spending 
on health and education; (4) ratifications are more common among older UN member 
countries and, to a lesser extent, those having more ratifications of non-drug treaties; 
(5) the discriminant analysis showed that it is possible to predict a substantial number 
of ratifications on the basis of data from only three variables: life expectancy, degree of 
economic development and degree of dmg problem. In other words, the likelihood of a 
particular country ratifying these treaties could be predicated by observing changes in 
these three variables, i.e., that as a country's life expectancy, economic development and 
degree of drug problem increase, so too will its likelihood of ratifying these treaties (Smart 
and Murray, 1984). 
Caldwell (1988) points out that several factors may defeat or delay ratification. Other 
Lsues of higher priority may displace consideration of a treaty on political agendas, espe- 
cially when no pressing national exigency is felt. Delay tends to work against ratification, 
providing time for mobilizing opposition. During a period of delay governments may 
change, as happened in the US after the negotiating, but before the formal signing of the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1981. Ministries and bureaucratic departments whose 
orientation is essentially national frequently object to treaty provisions that they regard 
as prejudicial to their missions. Agencies for agriculture, commerce, natural resources 
development and military defense have often opposed national environmental commit- 
ments that would or could compromise their objectives or operations. The US Navy, for 
example, objected to restrictions relating to whaling, alleging the need for whale oil for 
certain types of lubrication. State and provincial fish and game departments in Canada 
and the USA opposed provisions in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES) that would have restricted the activities of fur trappers. Further, budget 
and treasury officials tend to be especially unenthusiastic about appropriations for inter- 
national organizations and programs where there is no directly visible domestic economic 
payoff. Private manufacturing and commercial interests have also opposed international 
agreements that would impose trade restrictions either in relation to prohibited products, 
as under CITES, or require changes in their customary methods of operation. In cases 
where interpretation of the language of a treaty is concerned, adversely affected interests 
may also attempt to influence its implementation. 
Starke (1989) notes that the delays of states in 'ratifying or their unexpected withold- 
ing of ratifications have caused concern and raised serious problems. He indicates that 
the principal causes of delay were acutely investigated and reported on by a Committee 
appointed by the League of Nations. The causes reported in that study are summarized 
below: 
The complicated machinery of modern government involving protracted adminis- 
trative work before the decision to ratify or accede to a treaty. 
The absence of thorough preparatory work for treaties leading to defects which 
entitle states to withold or delay ratifications. 
The lack of time in parliament in countries where constitutional practice requires 
submission of the instrument to the legislature. 
Serious difficulties disclosed by the instrument only after signature and therefore 
requiring prolonged examination. 
The need for new national legislation or the need for increased expenditure as a 
result. 
Lack of interest on the part of states. 
Caldwell (1991) suggests that some of the reasons that the SALT I1 treaty was not 
ratified could be grouped into four principal categories: 
(1) President Carter's personality and his relations with his administration, as well 
as the appointments he had made; (2) public opinion and interest groups; (3) the Senate 
and executive-congressional relations, and (4) external events (Cuba, Iran, Afghanistan). 
He examines each of these in detail to substantiate his argument. Timing also appears 
to have been a critical factor, for he maintains that the Senate would likely have ratified 
the treaty had a vote been taken before the discovery of the Soviet Combat brigade in 
Cuba and the politicization of this issue b y  Senator Stone and Senator Church. Despite 
this he felt there was still a chance for ratification, if the treaty had not been linked to 
Soviet international behavior in the minds of senators and the public. Several members 
of the Carter administration (notably Zbigniew Brzezinski) had worked to link the arms 
control issue to Soviet foreign policy. The subsequent underlying shift in public opinion 
was a very important factor. 
Yet another issue brought up by Caldwell (1991; p.191) is Article 11, section 2 of the 
U.S. Constitution, which grants the president the power to make treaties, "...provided 
two-thirds of the Senators present concur ..." [emphasis added]. The issue has been long 
debated at Constitutional Conventions, and in fact the motion to substitute a simple 
majority vote for the two-thirds requirement failed by one vote. Critics of the two-thirds 
majority point out that this requirement is undemocratic and one which "...no other 
democracy has seen fit to adopt...". This in effect also means that assuming that the 
senators from the seventeen smallest states vote as a bloc, it is theoretically possible for 
thirty-four senators representing 7.1 per cent of the total U.S. population to block a treaty. 
Cook (1990) found that the presence of organized citizen opinion, quality of life, popu- 
lation dynamics and level of development are some of the national attributes that explain 
the variance in ratification rates. His hypothesis that ratification or non-ratification of 
global environmental treaties is conditioned by a state's position in the world economy, 
its need profile, its type of government and the level of organized citizen opinion is tested 
using multiple regression analysis on data on 38 global environmental treaties. The his- 
torical ratification record, he notes, shows that developed states are high ratifiers while 
the poorer countries are generally low ratifiers. 
Greilsammer (1991) probes the reasons behind the initial non-ratification and sub- 
sequent ratification of the EEC-Israel Protocols by the European Parliament while dis- 
cussing the question of economic sanctions in the political context. Since 1975 Israel had 
signed several significant agreements with the EEC on trade, industrial, technological, 
scientific and agricultural cooperation. With the prospect of the entry of Spain and Por- 
tugal into the Common Market, Israel, anxious to protect its agricultural sector, sought 
to consolidate its position through three additional protocols to a 1975 agreement. Trade 
with the EEC represented approximately 40 per cent of Israel's total imports and exports. 
In keeping with the Venice Declaration of June 1980 which insisted on the right of 
Palestinian self-determination and the necessity of including the PLO in the peace process, 
the EEC insisted that products from the West Bank and Gaza Strip be labelled as Pales- 
tinian and not 'made in Israel'. This hardening of the stance toward Israel was triggered 
by three events: ( 1 )  The Hindawi affair, which provoked tension between the Community 
and Syria; (2) The replacement of Shimon Peres by Itzak Sharnir as Prime Minister of 
Israel, and (3) Yaaser Arafat's declaration in Harare that he was ready, under certain 
conditions, to accept Resolution 242. From the European point of view the insistence on 
'direct exports' was an effort to put into practice principles long since announced within 
the framework of European Political Cooperation, i.e., non-recognition of the occupation 
or quasi-annexation of the territories, and recognition of the right of the Palestinians to 
manage their own affairs during a preparatory stage leading to self-determination. Israel 
feared that direct Palestinian exports could undermine Israeli exports and insisted that if 
the Palestinian farmers did export directly they would have to use Egyptian or Jordanian 
ports. 
Greilsammer also notes that the protocols were turned down precisely when the Euro- 
pean Parliament, after the Single Europe Act (1986), was seeking to affirm and strengthen 
its role in the framework of Community decision-making. There was therefore, a strong 
temptation for the Parliament to use the affair to insist on its new prerogative and the 
useful role it could play. 
In 1987, through the Brussels Declaration, the EC foreign ministers for the first time 
formally supported the convocation of an international conference for Middle East peace 
under UN auspices. This represented a hardening of the European position toward Israel. 
However, it was the outbreak of the intifada in December 1987 and the response by the 
Israeli authorities, Greilsammer maintains, that lead to a radicalization of the European 
positions. He suggests that if it were not for the events in the occupied territories, the 
protocols would probably have been approved without debate. The debates were held in 
March with strong points made for and against ratification, which ended with Parliament 
refusing to agree to the conclusion of the protocols. 
In April Israel showed flexibility on the question of direct exports and had agreed to 
drop the practice of demanding export licences for Palestinian farm exports. In June 1988, 
ratification of the protocols was once again put before Parliament, but was postponed to 
October. Between July and October two events occurred: Gaza citrus growers were 
granted 'direct' export licenses by an Israeli inter-ministerial committee and Arafat was 
invited to Strasbourg by the socialist group of the European Parliament. According 
to Greilsammer, these two developments contributed to Parliament agreeing to give its 
assent to the protocola: 314 deputies voted in favor of the ratification, 25 against and 19 
abstained. 
Looking at the substantive issues in treaties, Spector (1992a) postulated that as com- 
plexity and the multi-sectord nature of agreements increase, it is likely that ratification 
and implementation result in impasses. Spector's empirical analysis suggests that the 
growing body of multilateral legal instruments on environmental issues, as well as the 
potential for global and regional disputes over these issues, makes this an important topic 
for analysis and policy recommendations. Spector found that the average time for rat- 
ification of international environmental agreements was close to 6 years. He also found 
that long ratification times were strongly related to issue complexity in the agreement, 
and that the linkage of business issues to environmental issues in the treaties probably 
resulted in increased ratification delays, due to powerful business-based blocking coali- 
tions in the domestic arena. This delay results in successfully negotiated environmental 
agreements achieving 'too little, too late" when they finally come into effect. Therefore, 
new strategies to implement negotiated environmental agreements need to be identified 
that reduce national ratification delays and increase the probabilities of compliance. 
The following reasons for delays in the acceptance of treaties were suggested by Am- 
bassador Winfried Lang.4 Some of the reasons treaties are not ratified are: (1) Admin- 
istrative red tape; (2) Lack of interest i.e., no pressure of public opinion; (3) Opposition 
from industry; (4) Circumstances-political and economic-have changed since conclu- 
sion of the negotiations. He mentioned that the lack of interest was also evident in the 
nature of the parliament in a country; there are countries (for example in Latin America) 
where the parliaments are indifferent to the terms of treaties concluded so that there is 
no incentive to pursue the matter further than the negotiation stage. Further, it is hard 
to expect certain African or Asian countries to favor ratification of say, a convention that 
seeks to prevent deforestation, when the life-styles and livelihood of considerable sections 
of the population rely on wood as fuel for cooking. Recommendations for solar cookers, 
for example, would not find favor in a society that mainly uses fuel for cooking either 
early in the morning or late at night. Professor Manfred Nowak5 noted that, for exam- 
ple in Austria, administrative inertia and the complex requirements of the parliamentary 
process serve to delay ratification, whereas in other countries ratification could proceed 
more quickly just because there is no elaborate parliamentary process. Coalitions and 
bloc behavior were other reasons suggested for delays in ratification. 
'Profeeeor, University of Vienna. Personal communication, March 1992. 
sUniversity of Vienna. Personal communication, June 1992. 
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Table 1: Summary of findings in the literature survey (contd.) 
Hypotheses for Testing 
Few hypotheses concerning reasons for acceptance/nonacceptance of treaties have been 
tested systematically, as was evident from the literature. A few hypotheses on some 
salient features relevant to environmental treaties were selected for this study, based on 
the preceding literature and the availability of data. They are presented below. 
5.1 Across the Entire Sample of Countries 
Europe, an admixture of pluralistic and autocratic governments, capitalist and socialist 
systems, democracy and communism, with differing rates of economic growth and different 
legal or judicial systems, as well as large differences in the size and population of states, 
presents the possibility of heterogenous approaches to common issues. Would Europe 
present a united front regarding environmental issues, and if so, would examining the rate 
of acceptance of environmental treaties disclose some of the disparities? It was anticipated 
that European countries, when examined closely, would reflect significant differences in 
the rates of acceptance of environmental treaties. 
5.2 Differences across Blocs 
5.2.1 East-West: 
It was hypothesized that there are differences in the acceptance period between the East 
bloc and the West, on account of the vastly different systems of government, namely 
autocratic versus pluralistic. Pluralism, it was expected, would generate more interaction 
and debate between the groups affected or involved, or during the parliamentary process 
of democratic government, thus causing delays in the process of acceptance of treaties. 
In autocratic societies on the other hand, if acceptance fitted in with the ruling party's 
objectives, the process of acceptance would be greatly simplified. In any case, significant 
differences in the rate of acceptance were anticipated. 
5.2.2 EC, EFTA, Small States: 
The EC, known for its stringent regulations and extensive environmental legislation, it 
was hypothesized, would take considerably shorter to accept international environmental 
treaties than non-EC states, such as the EFTA countries. Small states' acceptance would 
be dependent on the patterns of their closest allies with whom their interests are invariably 
tied, thereby tending to shorter acceptance times. 
5.2.3 Nordic countries versus t h e  rest  of Europe: 
The Nordic states, with their relatively homogenous populations and patterns of govern- 
ment and their outspoken concern on environmental issues, it was hypothesized, would be 
significantly different from the rest of Europe in that the time taken for the acceptmce 
of environmental treaties would be considerably shorter. 
5.3 Differences in Acceptance Rates due to Public 
Pressure 
It was postulated that if the issues predominant in environmental treaties were broken 
down into categories such as climate change, atmospheric degradation (including concern 
over the ozone layer), forestry and natural resources depletion, the level of public concern 
over the various issues would differ from country to country or bloc to bloc, as well as 
at the local, national and international levels, thereby affecting the acceptance times of 
treaties in the different issue areas. 
5.3.1 Publ ic  opinion on environmental  issues 
The public opinion evident in a country indicates the saliency of environmental issues 
among the population at large. Pluralism makes for the participation of domestic and 
national stakeholders and popular concern increasingly finds a voice in determining the 
legislation passed on environmental issues. Parliamentary debates (see p. 17) are also 
viewed as useful fora for airing scientific theories and exploring conflicting economic or 
social interests. 
An OECD (1991a) study notes that over the past two decades governments have for- 
mulated policies, passed laws and created new institutions to control pollution and manage 
natural resources, while industry has introduced changes in products and production pro- 
cesses. In the OECD countries this happened largely in response to public awareness and 
persistent demands for a better environment. A ceordinated opinion poll carried out in 
the 1980s in the USA, Japan and 14 European countries showed clear public support for 
environmental protection, even at the expense of reduced economic growth. 
The importance of public opinion therefore should not be underestimated. Public opin- 
ion plays a role in most environmental issues (Lang, 1991; Benedick, 1991; Sj6stedt and 
Spector, 1993). Modern governments are sensitive to public opinion (Henkin, 1979). Too 
little publicity, which would exclude or foreclose public comment, is considered undemo- 
cratic, since it could leave room for shady deals, and in the end probably be inefficient. At 
some point in the process of acceptance the press and other media will comment on the 
agreement and bring it under public scrutiny (Zartman and Berman, 1982). It is for these 
reasons that the impact of public participation, as expressed through public opinion, was 
formulated as hypotheses and tested for all European countries. 
5.3.1.1 At the local and national levels 
It was hypothesized that increased public concern shortens the acceptance times for 
treaties, as governments are anxious to please their constituencies. 
5.3.1.2 At the international level 
It was postulated that public opinion regarding issues at the international level, such as 
forestry depletion, climate change and global warming, have a strong positive impact on 
the acceptance process, as NGOs and even industrial lobbies (e.g., the Base1 Conven- 
tion, as discussed in Kempel, 1993) can favor participation in international environmental 
treaties. Further, at the international level, high NGO participation could decrease the 
time to acceptance. 
5.4 Issue Saliency, Wealth and Quality of Life 
5.4.1 Research & Development Expenditures 
Features such as the creation of environmental ministries and public expenditure on en- 
vironmental concerns imply the saliency of environmental issues in a country. The hy- 
pothesis may be formulated as follows: The higher the public R & D expenditures on 
environmental protection the greater the likelihood of reduced time to acceptance. 
5.4.2 Gross Domestic Product 
It was assumed that the wealth of a country would create differences in acceptance, as 
wealthier nations, more able to respond to stringent measures imposed by treaty require- 
ments, would be in a better position to comply, thereby reducing the time taken for 
acceptance. The GDP of a country, or the total value of all goods and services produced 
by a country (GNP less net investment incomes from foreign nations), may be taken to be 
an indicator of the wealth of a nation. A hypothesis regarding the impact of the wealth of 
a nation on the acceptance time for environmental treaties may be formulated as follows: 
The greater the GDP of a country the more likely it is that acceptance times will be 
reduced. 
6.4.3 Human Development Index 
A quality of life indicator, for example, the Human Development Index (HDI)6 is taken 
to be an indicator of the quality of life. The HDI could also be a factor in determining 
the rate of acceptance of treaties, in reasoning parallel to that above, regarding wealth. 
The hypothesis could be stated as: The greater the HDI of a country, the higher the 
public concern on environmental issues, and the more likely it is that acceptance times 
will be reduced. 
These propositions are examined further on pp. 36 e t  seq. 
6 Methodology 
First, acceptance time was operationalized as the average time taken by a country to ratify 
the agreement. The variable was measured for a country by calculating the number of 
years between adoption of the treaty and entry into force for each country and averaging 
it over the number of treaties each country had accepted. Ideally, the period should be 
measured from the date of signature by a state party, to the date of deposit of instruments 
of acceptance. However, in most cases, only the date of adoption and date of entry into 
force were available. 
The unit of analysis was the country. Several variables were measured for each coun- 
try. The independent variables measured were public opinion at the local, national and 
international levels, the wealth of a country measured by the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), the quality of life as indicated by the Human Development Index (HDI), and the 
percentage of total public appropriations spent on R & D for environmental protection. 
A total of one dependent and four independent variables were analyzed. 
'see section on Data p. 35 
Europe being easily divisible into blocs, the data was also analyzed according to the 
blocs shown below: 
1. European Communities/European Community (EC) 
2. European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
3. Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, CSSR, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia), 
and 
4. Small States/Principalities (Cyprus, Lichtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Marino), 
with populations less than 1 million. 
The contents of the 61 treaties were also analyzed and categorized according to is- 
sue categories, as follows, so as to gauge the importance of issues and the impact issue 
substance may have on the period required for acceptance. The treaties were by and 
large multiple-issue, ind  thus were double-coded, meaning they fell into more than one 
category. While in general, conservation and protection were the underlying objectives 
of all the treaties, nevertheless, in the following categorization only the treaties which 
specifically mentioned conservation or protection were allocated to the first category be- 
low. The treaties on atmospheric degradation include the agreements on the ozone layer, 
and some of the International Labour Organization (ILO) treaties were counted in the 
category on restrictions on commerce and industry. 
1. Conservation and protection 
2. Riparian and marine pollution 
3. Atmospheric degradation 
4. Nuclear and security issues 
5. Restrictions on commerce and industry 
6. Information exchange and technical cooperation. 
Analyses were conducted in two ways: 
1. Baaed on the entire sample of treaties; 
2. Based on each issue category, i.e., for all conservation treaties separately, or all 
atmospheric treaties, etc. 
The SYSTAT (Wilkinson, 1987) program was used for the correlations and statistical 
tests run on the data. The results are discussed on pp. 36 et seq. 
7 Data: Sources and Types 
Data on multilateral environmental treaties was extracted from the May 1991 UNEP 
Register of International Treaties and Other Agreements in the Field of the Environment 
(UNEP/GC.lG/Inf.4). Only Conventions, Protocols and Agreements were taken. Data 
on amendments was not always complete, and was therefore not included in the sample, 
with the exception of the Amendment to the Montreal Protocol. Only those treaties that 
were adopted after 1972 and entered into force thereafter (up to  1992) were included, and 
only those where at least one European country is or was a party. Data on acceptances 
deposited after May 1991 was not always available, although efforts were made to obtain 
as much information as possible. As of June 1992, the Law of the Sea had not yet entered 
into force,7 therefore it was not included in this sample. 
A sample of 61 environmental treaties was selected using the above criteria. 1972 was 
selected as the starting point because it was felt that it would be interesting to mea- 
sure acceptance in the period after t he 1972 Stockholm Conference, when environmental 
awareness was likely to be on the rise. 
The countries of Europe (n=31) in the sample excludes Turkey but includes the Eu- 
ropean Community as a bloc. By the Single European Act (art. 130), in 1987 formal 
responsibility for environmental matters was transferred from the member states to the 
EC; although there is controversy and dissatisfaction among the states regarding this, the 
EC has signed treaties as a bloc. 
Standard UN, as well as World Resources Institute (1992), listings of the countries 
of Europe were taken to be the norm in determining this list. The USSR was omitted 
from this analysis because often it is treated as a separate category in the above listings. 
Albania, Andorra, Gibraltar and the Holy See were excluded due to lack of data. 
7~nformation received from Dr. K. Opoku, Senior Legal Liaison Officer, Office of the Director General, 
United Natione Office at Vienna. 
Data on public opinion on environmental problems was drawn from OECD (1991a), 
on public R & D expenditures for environmental protection from OECD (1991b), the 
Human Development Index (HDI)' from UNDP (1991). The HDI index for 1991 was 
used for this analysis. All the countries of Europe in this sample were in the "high human 
developmentn group with the exception of Romania, which was in the "medium human 
developmentn group with an index rating of 0.762. 
Data on GDP per capita (PPP$1985-1988) was taken from UNDP (1991). The figures 
represent real GDP per capita (purchasing power parities [PPP]). As noted in the UNDP 
report, the use of official exchange rates to convert the national currency figures to US 
dollars does not attempt to measure the relative domestic purchasing powers of currencies. 
Therefore the UN International Comparison Project (ICP) developed measures of real 
GDP on an internationally comparable scale using purchasing power parities instead of 
exchange rates as conversion factors, expressed in international dollars. 
Public R & D expenditures (in million US$ at 1985 prices and PPPs and as a per cent of 
total R & D budget appropriations) for environmental protection in 17 European countries 
was taken from OECD (1991b). Data refer to government R & D budget appropriations. 
The mid-point selected for the data was 1981. Environmental protection includes R & D 
intended to protect the physical environment from degradation. It includes all research 
sThe concept of human development, first introduced in the 1990 UNDP report, established that the 
basic objective of human development is to enlarge the range of people's choices to make development 
more democratic and participatory. These choices should include access to income and employment 
opportunities, education, health, and a clean and safe environment. Individuals should also have the 
opportunity to participate fully in community decisions and to enjoy human, economic and political 
freedoms. The creation of the concept was motivated by the realization that people's priorities are not 
fixed, but change as circumstances and aspirations change, so that they must all be taken together, with 
no single dimension pursued at the expense of the other. Policy makers frequently concentrate on just 
one dimension, namely, income, which is a gross oversimplification and distortion of reality. The human 
development index is a more realistic statistical measure of human development than mere gross national 
product (GNP) per head. The human development indicators take into consideration factors such as life 
expectancy a t  birth, adult literacy, years of schooling, income beyond the poverty level, etc. 
The HDI has caused controversy, for it has been enthusiastically received in some circles and just as 
vehemently denounced, presumably for political rearrons, in other milieux. This is not surprising, 8s some 
countries that enjoyed higher rankings in purely GNPIGDP oriented statistics now fall into a lower rank 
order. Other criticism (The Economist, May 26, 1990) is directed at its subjectivity and arbitrariness, 
i.e., the weighting of purchasing power, life expectancy and literacy. A strength, it is admitted, is that it 
reminds thoee who cannot see beyond the end of their statistics that there is more to life than GNP. 
relating to pollution: study of origins and causes, diffusion and transformation as well 
as the effects on man and the environment, research on end-of-line pollution controls, 
but excludes research on changes in the production process (the development of clean 
technologies) that result in the generation of less pollution. The research was assigned to 
the relevant category (e.g., industry, energy, etc.) relating to the activities causing the 
pollution. 
Data on public opinion on environmental problems (OECD, 1991a) was for 14 Euro- 
pean countries and the EC, and was gathered in the period 1988-1990. It represents the 
percentage of persons 'very concerned" about environmental problems at the local level 
(on waste disposal, drinking water quality and air pollution); at the national level (on 
water and air pollution) and at the international level (on the depletion of world forest 
and natural resources and possible climate changes brought about by COz). Separate 
measures were available for each of these levels and issue areas of concern. 
Analysis 
8.1 Descriptive Results 
8.1.1 Across t h e  entire sample of countries 
On calculating the average number of years that the countries of Europe required for the 
acceptance of environmental treaties in the sample under consideration, it was observed 
that the range for all of Europe (n=31) averaged between 3.000-6.462 years (see Figure 
3). It may be noted that small states and Eastern European countries were not limited 
to one end of the scale, but were distributed across the range. 
The overall average obtained for all the countries of Europe (n=31) was 4.162 years 
for the period 1972-1992. In the Spector (1992a) study the average time, over seven 
decades, to ratify environmental agreements was 5.8 years. The sample used in that study 
was 33 agreements which had already entered into force, which dealt with international 
environmental issues (as opposed to regional issues) and which were not restricted to 
certain countries or specific geographic regions. 
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Figure 3: Average acceptance rates for Europe 
8.1.2 Int er-bloc variations 
Bloc variations were another feature that was anticipated in this study as being a product 
of the heterogenity that is Europe. However, the results of the average number of years 
required for acceptance when analyzed by blocs were: 
1. EC (n=13) 4.250 yrs. 
2. EFTA (n=6) 3.745 yrs. 
3. Eastern Europe (n=7) 4.127 yrs. 
4. Small States/Principalities (n=5) 4.486 yrs. 
There was no statistically significant difference between the 4 groups (p=.515). 
It can only be surmised here that the greater interest in environmental issues shown 
by EC and EFTA countries, hypothesized to produce acceleration in the time to accep- 
tance, is slowed down by the parliamentary process. In parallel, in the former East bloc, 
where only a rubber-stamp parliamentary system existed, there were interest groups and 
stakeholders in bureaucracy--each vying for influencewhich slowed down acceptance 
processes as well. Small states would be inclined to follow the patterns set by their more 
powerful allies, hence the lack of significant differences between these four blocs. 
8.1.2.1 East- West: 
It was hypothesized that there are differences in the acceptance period between the East 
bloc and the West, on account of the vastly different systems of government, namely 
autocratic versus pluralistic. 
A t-test run on the sample, however, did not yield any statistically significant results. 
As suggested above, this could be because delays caused by the realities of both systems 
even out in practice. 
8 . 1 2 2  Nordic countries versus the rest of Europe: 
The Nordic states, with their relatively homogenous populations and patterns of govern- 
ment and their outspoken concern on environmental issues, it was hypothesized, would 
be significantly different from the rest of  Europe in the time taken for the acceptance of 
environment a1 treaties. 
An independent samples t-test resulted in means of 3.468 years for the Nordic countries 
(n=5) and 4.296 years for the rest of Europe, which represents a statistically significant 
difference (p=.006) between the means for the Nordic countries and the rest of Europe, 
thus confirming the hypothesis. 
8.1.3 Differences in acceptance rates due to issue 
When the treaties were analyzed by issue category, the average years to acceptance across 
all the countries were as follows: 
Conservation and protection: 4.079 yrs. 
Riparian and marine pollution: 5.190 yrs. 
Atmospheric degradation: 2.526 yrs. 
Nuclear and security issues: 3.918 yrs. 
Restrictions on commerce and industry: 4.129 yrs. 
Information exchange and technical cooperation: 3.693 yrs. 
This indicates that the willingness to accept treaties dealing with atmospheric degra- 
dation is significantly higher. 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was run on these means by treaty category to 
determine differences between the four blocs, issue by issue (see Table 2). 
There was only one statistically significant difference (F test, p=.012) between the 
average number of years for acceptance between the four blocs, on treaties dealing with 
atmospheric issues. 
Small states accepted treaties on atmospheric issues much faster than all other group- 
ings. 
Overall, as can be seen in Table 2, atmospheric degradation treaties compare favorably 
with all the other categories of treaties. This may be due to the fact that treaties dealing 
with the atmosphere received considerably more media exposure, NGO lobbying and input 
from the scientific community than other categories of treaties (Benedick, 1991). 

8.2 Hypotheses Testing 
8.2.1 Publ ic  opinion o n  environmental  issues 
8.2.1.1 At the local and national levels 
It was hypothesized that increased public concern shortens the acceptance times for 
treaties, as governments are anxious to please their constituencies . 
Several tests were run to evaluate the impact of public opinion a t  the local and national 
level. The following were the findings: 
There was a significant correlation (r=.268) between public concern regarding local 
air pollution, and the average acceptance times of treaties, which increases with increased 
concern at the local level. 
This indicates that concern over local issues, manifested by local lobbies and coalitions 
contribute to delays in the acceptance of international environmental treaties. 
A much stronger correlation (r=.768) was obtained between public concern regarding 
local drinking water quality and the average acceptance times of international treaties. 
This again implies that concern over local issues and local pressure-groups or coalitions 
contribute to delays in the acceptance of environmen t d  treaties. 
This last could be due to factors such as stakeholders' fear of regulation, limited 
attention span on the part of the public to issues that directly affect their lives, and on 
the part of the negotiators themselves, when the issues are too numerous and complex. In 
addition, all too often the political, as well as bureaucratic, resources are not concentrated 
enough, or available (Winham, 1992). 
Statistically significant results were not obtained when tests were run using data on the 
percentage of people interviewed who were concerned with issues such as water pollution 
and air pollution a t  the national level. 
8 2  1.2 At the international level 
It was postulated that public opinion regarding international issues, such as forestry 
depletion, climate change and global warming, have a strong positive impact on the 
acceptance process, decreasing the time to acceptance. 
The hypothesis regarding public concern, at the international level, with respect to 
depletion of world forest and natural resources, as well as climate change, was tested for 
possible impacts on acceptance and the findings were as follows: 
There waa a significant correlation (r=-.377) between public concern regarding global 
depletion of world forest and natural resources on the acceptance times of treaties. 
This implies that public opinion, national lobbies and coalitions focused on interna- 
tional issues do indeed contribute to accelerate the acceptance of international environ- 
men t a1 treaties. 
A yet stronger correlation (r=-.492) indicated that public concern regarding global 
climate change induced by carbon dioxide covaries with reduced acceptance periods for 
environmental treaties. 
This again indicates that public concern, national lobbies and coalitions on global 
issues such aa climate change do contribute to speed up the acceptance of environmental 
treaties. Public concern about international environmental issues all display negative 
correlations (see Table 3), indicating that as public concern increases, the average time 
to accept treaties decreases. 
8.2.2 Gross Domestic Product 
The hypothesis was: The greater the GDP of a country the more likely it is that acceptance 
times will be reduced. 
A statistically significant correlation (r=- ,340) was obtained, indicating that the 
higher a country's GDP per capita, the shorter the acceptance times of countries. 
This implies that the higher the GDP, the more likely it is that acceptance times are 
reduced, or that wealth does co-vary with shorter acceptance periods. 
8.2.3 Human Development Index 
The HD19 was taken to be an indicator of the quality of life. The hypothesis was: The 
greater the HDI of a country, the higher the public concern on environmental issues and 
the more likely it is that acceptance times will be reduced. 
Correlations that were statistically significant were obtained for treaties in the cate- 
gories of conservation and protection, riparian and marine pollution, atmospheric degra- 
dation, and restrictions on commerce and industry (r=-,489, -.433, -.505, -.509, re- 
spectively) between the HDI of a country and the average time to acceptance, indicating 
that the HDI co-varies with shorter acceptance periods (see Table 3). 
9see eection on Data p. 35 
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8.2.4 Research & Development Expenditures 
The hypothesis was as follows: The higher the public R & D expenditures on environ- 
mental protection, the greater the likelihood of reduced time to acceptance. 
There was a statistically significant correlation (r=-.492) between the average accep- 
tance time for riparian and marine pollution treaties with public R & D expenditures for 
1981. 
R & D expenditures for 1989 generated similar results (r=-.413). 
This implies that as R & D expenditures increase, the time required for the acceptance 
of treaties in the category of riparian and marine pollution decreases. 
9 Conclusions and Recommendations 
An attempt has been made in this study to replicate some of the findings discussed in the 
literature regarding the acceptance or non-accept ance of treaties, with special reference 
to environmental treaties. 
9.1 Findings 
Interestingly, some of the findings of this study corroborate those arrived at by Smart 
and Murray (1984) and Cook (1990). Smart and Murray (see p. 21) found that countries 
with higher economic development and higher spending on health and education were 
more likely to ratify the drug treaties in their sample. Cook (see p. 24) concluded that 
organized citizen opinion, quality of life, population dynamics and level of development 
are national attributes that explain high and low ratification rates. 
In this study it was found that the higher the GDP and HDI, as well as R & D 
expenditure, the more likely it is that acceptance times are reduced. 
In reviewing how the hypotheses stood up to empirical testing it appears that most of 
them, with the exception of a few, were substantiated by the data analysis. The exceptions 
were that public concern at the local level increased acceptance time. It was anticipated 
that the reverse would be the case; however, when tested, this hypothesis was turned on 
its head. Some possible reasons for this are noted on p. 41 et seq. 
Further, it had been hypothesized that significant differences in the acceptance times 
of East and West would result, due to differences in domestic and political processes. 
Dependent Variable : Average Years 
Independent Variables 
Table 3: Correlations between dependent and independent variables 
However, there was no clear indication that this indeed was the case. 
Public opinion on national-level environmental issues yielded some correlations that 
were positive and some negative; the reasons for this are not clear and calls for further 
research. Similar discrepancies were noticed in the case of maritime treaties, as well as 
those on nuclear and security issues. This too calls for further investigation. 
However, many significant results for the total sample were reinforced by the issue-by- 
issue analysis. 
9.2 Next Steps 
Given below are some suggestions for possible future work in this area. 
First, some of the conclusions of this preliminary diagnosis of the first step in the 
post-agreement cycle are that it may be worthwhile examining the reasons behind the 
quicker acceptance times of the Nordic countries. 
Lang (1991) remarks on the leadership shown by the Scandinavian countries in the 
environmental domain. In this context Professor Gunnar Sj6stedtl0 suggests several po- 
litical, legal, institutional and cultural factors. For example, the power vacuum left by 
the lack of interest on the part of the USA and Japan in taking the leadership on environ- 
mental issues (it not being of interest to their constituencies), which the Nordic countries 
filled, is an example of the political priorities of the one set of countries versus the politi- 
cal will of the other. Further, Norway and Sweden were disproportionately influential on 
environmental issues and took the initiative unhesitatingly. For example, the acid rain 
problem was first recognized and formulated by a Swede; the Brundtland reports formed 
the intellectual premise for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop- 
ment and the process was initiated by the Swedish proposal to the UN General Assembly. 
The fact that the government of Sweden, for instance, represents the mainstream views on 
environmental issues, whereas the opposition's position is that not enough is being done to 
preserve the environment, is indicative of the high degree of concern and public pressure 
exerted on the government for higher standards. The differences in the protestant and 
catholic ethic also present interesting reasons for the Scandinavian countries, together 
with Britain and the Netherlands, pushing to achieve high goals, whereas the catholic 
perspective would be to accept high goals as excellent but unattainable standards. This 
1°The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm. Personal communication, September 1992. 
could be an alternative hypothesis for further investigation. 
Second, another interesting direction would be to investigate the reasons behind the 
quicker ratification times required for atmospheric treaties, especially in contrast to the 
riparian and marine pollution treaties. Third, other post-agreement processes such as 
regime formation, regime operation, regime adjustment, monitoring, reporting and sub- 
sequent compliance are areas requiring urgent investigation. Either diagnostic analysis, 
such aa this study, or case studies could be used as methods for analysis. 
Schachter et al. (1971) on reviewing their evidence, suggest that treaties be submitted 
to governments for scrutiny at the draft stage (i.e., during the negotiation itself) and that 
governments set up special committees to advise on these, drawing on non-governmental 
experts as well, to review the drafts. Further, if states participate in the treaty conference 
and play a role in the negotiation process, they are in a better position to appreciate the 
substance, objectives and scope of the treaties, which works to facilitate the acceptance 
process. If the team of experts that attends the treaty conference is also charged with the 
task of coordinating the preparatory administrative work for the country's acceptance of 
the treaty, it acts as a catalyst in the process. Centralization of the administrative work 
in one unit of the foreign ministry, special inter-departmental coordination committees 
and referral to the cabinet to resolve inter-departmental disputes are other ways in which 
the process can be hastened. Better translation facilities for countries that do not use one 
of the five UN languages and inter-governmental consultations on translations in common 
languages could help speed treaty acceptance. Better mechanisms for coordination on the 
domestic scene and recognition of the promotional role that permanent missions to the 
UN have played in facilitating acceptance were other factors mentioned in the study. Sug- 
gestions on international measures to foster acceptance, as well as specific areas requiring 
further research, are listed in this study. 
Smart and Murray (1984) recommend, in their study of drug treaties, that with im- 
provements in life expectancy, economic development and degree of drug problem increase, 
the chances of ratifying these treaties will increase. However, these are long-term solu- 
tions. In the shorter term, solutions such as expert legal or translation help could increase 
the understanding and acceptance of treaties. Consultants could be used to advise on the 
mechanisms needed for ratification, thereby enhancing the process, as also would strong 
support from international agencies, as well as funding. 
Weissbrodt (1982) suggests that regulatory mechanisms for encouraging acceptance 
would be more effective than mere exhortations. He examines the initial period of the 
Working Group on the Encouragement of Universal Acceptance of Human Rights Instru- 
ments and concludes that the reasons (see p. 20) for non-ratification should be investigated 
further and that the Working Group could be more effective if it were given specific author- 
ity to solicit governmental reports. This might have been effected if either ECOSOC or 
the General Assembly had given it an uncontestable mandate, as well as higher visibility. 
In the climate change negotiations cost-effectiveness is viewed as more important at 
present than that of ecological desirability." Therefore, states, especially those of the 
south, have little interest in negotiating a treaty, let alone considering the intricacies of 
acceptance, domestic legislation and implementation. 
The recommendations in Spector (1992a) apply here: 
Modify the negotiation process by actively involving domestic stakeholders and 
thereby providing them with a sense of ownership over the internationally nego- 
tiated treaties. 
Fractionate issues creatively into manageable, independent elements and resolve 
easier issues first; this disentangles the issues that are linked. Too many issues and 
linkages result in longer ratification times. 
Provide incentives, especially economic ones, which could be incorporated in treaties 
to make for better ratification time and implementation. 
Modify the post-agreement process by educating national political actors or stake- 
holders, using NGOs, the media and the scientific community. 
Some of the conclusions arrived at by SjGstedt and Spector (1993) regarding environ- 
mental negotiations are also of relevance here. They suggest that public consciousness 
raising, i.e., educating the public regarding potential damages to the environment, and the 
associated costs, could mobilize actors who would then increase public pressure, leading to 
shorter lag time to the acceptance of treaties. Another recommendation they make is to 
develop the institutional structure and administrative support to epistemic communities, 
as such transnational groups could also function as driving forces, much like the impact 
made by NGOs. 
"Ambassador W. Lang, personal communication. 
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Alternatives to Ratification: An Aside 
Having examined some of the factors that cause undue delays in acceptance, it may be 
worthwhile looking at ways of sidestepping the tedious and long-winded process of ratifi- 
cation. It is not strictly true that ratification is the only way to attain the commitment 
to a treaty's provisions as may be achieved through it. 
Starke (1989) suggests that delays in ratification may explain the recent tendency in 
treaty practice to dispense with such a requirement and the growth in the practice of 
concluding arrangements between governments in more simplified forms. 
Schachter et al. (1971) have pointed out that the General Assembly has used devices 
other than treaties in order to promote the aims of the UN. Such mechanisms include 
resolutions declaratory of international law, the creation of UN bodies for the performance 
of particular functions (e.g., UNICEF and UNWRA) and declarations of the General 
Assembly. These devices do not require specific ratification or acceptance by states. 
The Harvard Law Review (1991) draws attention to the possibilities offered by in- 
ternational agencies that can help bypass the state level. By maintaining contacts with 
environmentalists and experts, the agencies can influence national policy from within the 
state, working with and within national governments to train officials and foster an en- 
vironmental ethic. This would also increase the likelihood that environmental treaties 
will be signed and enforced. International agencies could undertake these activities with- 
out significantly impinging on sovereignty. NGOs could play a role at the grass roots 
level, while epistemic communities of environmental experts inside and outside state 
government who have the scientific and political power to transform international en- 
vironmental regimes, could combat the traditional, less effective state-to-st ate level of 
international law. UNEP, by establishing direct links that bypass foreign ministries, with 
permission from the relevant states, has achieved successful projects such as the Mediter- 
ranean Pollution Monitoring and Research Programme. By giving international agencies 
broad regulatory powers much can be accomplished via routes that provide alternatives 
to the traditional approach. 
Susskind and Ozawa (1992) point out that several mechanisms exist that can be used 
to bolster traditional treaty-making, e.g., some treaties include annexes or appendixes 
stipulating procedures for revising a treaty as new information becomes available. This 
makes it possible to avoid a new round of ratification. Signatories can also take exception 
to clauses in one or another annex while signing the general treaty and the ratification 
of one or more protocols could be required as the price of membership in a framework 
convent ion. 
Chayes and Chayes (1991b) note the inherent deficiencies of using the traditional 
lawmaking treaty as the principle legislative instrument in an international environmental 
regime. Each new treaty has to be ratified in accordance with the domestic procedures of 
the members, resulting in delay, at best. At worst, the political battles that attend the 
adoption of any important international agreement affecting domestic economic interests 
may prevent ratification altogether. They go on to describe numerous examples where, in 
practice, mechanisms have evolved to bypass ratification. The key requirement in each of 
these cases is an international institution or organization created by a treaty that grants 
it the necessary powers and etipulates the processes for action. The interpretation of the 
agreement is one of the ways by which the organization can bind members without further 
reference to national legislatures. By ratifying this constitutive treaty, the state accepts 
the powers and processes specified in it, thus satisfying the international law requirement 
of consent to the obligations that may be created. Some examples discussed by Sand 
(1991) are recalled below. 
Sand (1991; pp. 250-256) lists several options for bypassing the long drawn out treaty 
method which results in time lags between drafting, adoption, ratification and entry into 
force. He suggests how "fast tracks" can be devised that can beat the slowest boat rule. 
They are, provisional treaty application, soft law options and delegated lawmaking. 
Provisional treaty application is a recognized procedure under the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (art.25) A classic example is the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) which has operated for more than forty years on the basis of a Protocol 
of Provisional Application. 
The signatories to the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution also decided, by separate resolution, to "initiate, as soon as possible and on 
an interim basis, the provisional implementation of the convention" and to "carry out 
the obligations arising from the convention to the maximum extent possible pending its 
entry into force." The Interim Executive Body subsequently held annual meetings, created 
subsidiary working groups, and so on, well before the Convention came into effect in 1983. 
When adopting the first protocol under the convention, in 1984, on long-term financing 
of the European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP), the signatories again 
decided by resolution, pending the entry into force of the protocol, 'to contribute to 
the financing of EMEP on a voluntary basis, in an amount equal to  the mandatory 
contributions expected from them under the provisions of the protocol if all signatories 
had become parties." Thus voluntary interim funding to the tune of 3.4 million dollars 
was generated, enabling the program to operate effectively until the protocol entered into 
force in 1988. 
The final act of the 1989 Base1 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move- 
ments of Hazardous Wastes took a similar approach with its resolution that until the 
convention came into force, all states would "refrain from activities which are inconsistent 
with the objectives and purpose of the convention," and with other resolutions established 
preparatory technical working groups, and an interim secretariat with voluntary funding. 
States may decide to  forgo the treaty method altogether and to recommend, by joint 
declaration, common rules of conduct, generally referred to as soft law. Their practical 
advantage is that they are not subject to national ratification and therefore can take im- 
mediate effect. UNEP has been a prolific soft-law maker, with its series of environmental 
law guidelines and principles, in typical treaty language, but with the use of the verb 
'should" instead of 'shall". After initial adoption by ad hoc groups of experts nominated 
by governments, these provisions are normally approved by the UNEP Governing Council 
for submission to the UN General Assembly, which either incorporates them in a resolu- 
tion (as in the case of the 1982 World Charter for Nature) or recommends it for use in 
the formulation of international agreements or national legislation. 
Delegated lawmaking is another way of bypassing ratification. This may be achieved 
by delegating powers to adopt and regularly amend 'technical" standards to a specialized 
intergovernmental body. This technique was gradually refined and used by several global 
and regional organizations in order to cope with frequent technological change. The 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and 
a number of European conventions on rail and road transport placed their international 
standards in separate technical annexes or regulations that are periodically revised in 
intergovernmental meetings without having to go through ratification. The international 
health regulations of the World Health Organization (WHO), the standard meteorological 
practices and procedures of the World Meteorological Organization and the standards for 
facilitation of international maritime traffic are well known for being smoothly functioning 
regulatory regimes. 
Others share this view. For example, Young, Demko and Ramakrishna (1991; p.23) 
suggest that there is no need to be restricted by eitherlor choices in the debate over formal 
instruments and informal arrangements in the guise of soft law. They recommend that 
negotiators responsible for drafting specific provisions should frame conventions in such 
a way aa to encourage parties to exceed formal standards and to allow states' standards 
to evolve continuously, without calling for formal ratification at every step. 
However, avoiding formal acceptance raises the issue of democratic controls over the 
delegated standard-setting. Sand (199 1) discusses this and suggests that one option, 
which seems practicable only under conditions of close regional integration, is to create 
a supranational parliamentary body for the purpose of exercising controls. The Envi- 
ronment Committee of the European Parliament is an example of this; it has begun to 
play an important role as watchdog for the community. An alternative to this would 
be to retain a measure of national endorsement, short of parliamentary ratification, for 
common standards agreed upon, either by requiring affirmative acceptance by govern- 
ments (the international food standards of the Codex Alimentarius Commission being an 
example), or by providing the possibility for dissenting states to opt out of an agreed 
standard or amendment within a specified time period (as stipulated in the constitutions 
of the WHO, the WMO, the UN convention on narcotic drugs and in several international 
fisheries agreements). 
A good example of the opting out procedure relating to a problem of global pollution 
control is the adoption and amendment of technical annexes under the 1944 Chicago Con- 
vention on International Civil Aviation. Arts. 37 and 54 worldwide standards on aircraft 
noise and aircraft engine emissions have been laid down since 1981 by the Council of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Once adopted by this body, an annex 
becomes mandatory, without ratification, for all states who do not within sixty days notify 
the council of their intention to apply different national rules, and for all air traffic over 
the high seas. This flexible tacit-consent procedure, which was designed with the view 
to reconciling the divergent requirements of developed and developing countries, facili- 
tates progressive technical adjustment of standards by majority decision, without forcing 
complete uniformity. This may be the closest thing to global environmental legislation. 
Young, Demko and Ramakrishna (1991) note that the science of climate change, for ex- 
ample, is characterized by profound uncertainties and rapid advances in research. There- 
fore, any governance system must seek not only to stimulate the growth of knowledge, but 
also provide mechanisms for integrating new insights into the system, without triggering 
a time-consuming and highly politicized ratification process. However, beyond this, the 
success of governance systems is linked to the development of broader cognitive constructs 
capable of providing the intellectual underpinnings for institutional arrangements. In the 
case of climate change, it is likely to result in a new worldview, that is, an integrated set 
of principles, propositions and norms that would redefine human aspirations and give rise 
to a restructured ethical system to guide human-environment relations. The initiation of 
processes in parallel to ongoing negotiations aimed at accelerating the dissemination of 
new perspectives on human-environment relations is essential. 
Therefore, whilst encouraging the ratification process, it is also critical to explore 
alternatives to acceptance during the process of treaty-making. 
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